More about Why Symbolics Failed
Friday, December 21st, 2007I just came across “Symbolics, Inc: A failure of heterogeneous engineering” by Alvin Graylin, Kari Anne Hoir Kjolaas, Jonathan Loflin, and Jimmie D. Walker III (it doesn’t say with whom they are affiliated, and there is no date), at http://www.sts.tu-harburg.de/~r.f.moeller/symbolics-info/Symbolics.pdf
This is an excellent paper, and if you are interested in what happened to Symbolics, it’s a must-read.
The paper’s thesis is based on a concept called “heterogeneous engineering”, but it’s hard to see what they mean by that other than “running a company well”. They have fancy ways of saying that you can’t just do technology, you have to do marketing and sales and finance and so on, which is rather obvious. They are quite right about the wide diversity of feelings about the long-term vision of Symbolics, and I should have mentioned that in my essay as being one of the biggest problems with Symbolics. The random directions of R&D, often not co-ordinated with the rest of the company, are well-described here (they had good sources, including lots of characteristically, harshly honest email from Dave Moon). The separation between the software part of the company in Cambridge, MA and the hardware part of the company in Woodland Hills (later Chatsworth) CA was also a real problem. They say “Once funds were available, Symbolics was spending money like a lottery winner with new-found riches” and that’s absolutely correct. Feature creep was indeed extremely rampant. The paper also has financial figures for Symbolics, which are quite interesting and revealing, showing a steady rise through 1986, followed by falling revenues and negative earnings from 1987 to 1989.
Here are some points I dispute. They say “During the years of growth Symbolics had been searching for a CEO”, leading up to the hiring of Brian Sear. I am pretty sure that only happened when the trouble started. I disagree with the statement by Brian Sear that we didn’t take care of our current customers; we really did work hard at that, and I think that’s one of the reasons so many former Symbolics customers are so nostalgic. I don’t think Russell is right that “many of the Symbolics machines were purchased by researchers funded through the Star Wars program”, a point which they repeat many times. However, many were funded through DARPA, and if you just substitute that for all the claims about “Star Wars”, then what they say is right. The claim that “the proliferation of LISP machines may have exceeded the proliferation of LISP programmers” is hyperbole. It’s not true that nobody thought about a broader market than the researchers; rather, we intended to sell to value-added resellers (VAR’s) and original equipment manufacturers (OEM’s). The phrase “VARs and OEMs” was practically a mantra. Unfortunately, we only managed to do it once (ICAD). While they are right that Sun machines “could be used for many other applications”, the interesting point is the reason for that: why did Sun’s have many applications available? The rise of Unix as a portable platform, which was a new concept at the time, had a lot to do with it, as well as Sun’s prices. They don’t consider why Apollo failed.
There’s plenty more. To the authors, wherever you are: thank you very much!